Our page has written many times about a new historical mission that our Navy will undertake, for the first time in its glorious history. To this day, the Navy has never fought in the eastern Mediterranean, nor has it had the means or reasons to do so. Any caravans fighting in Cyprus would have another purpose, while near the island they would interfere with the means of our Cypriot brothers. But now the exclusive economic zone to which Greece is entitled is a vast area between Crete and Cyprus.
Fourth Frigate FDI HN Still Looming Or Shall We Say Goodbye?
Electricity transmission pipelines are already planned to pass through this area (the agreement has been made), but also natural gas (EASTMED, if and when the whole idea goes through). Also, the area south of Crete has oil and natural gas, which belong to Greece. In short, since this area must be protected, the railway must not only have “presence”, but “sovereignty”.
At the time of writing, the Navy has (we emphasize “only”) 3 FDI HN frigates with an area air defense capability on call. We think it is easy for everyone to realize that 3 or even 4 is not enough to cover such a large area. PN now needs to operate in the Aegean Sea, in the eastern Mediterranean (between Crete and Cyprus), to cover Cyprus, to cover and control southern Crete, but also in the Ionian Sea (with a possible base for Turkish submarines in Albania, and a naval base in Tripoli, Libya). We understand that the 18 ships PN wants is the minimum, not the maximum.
Also, since finding ships – currently in use – with air defense capability for the area is very difficult to impossible, another solution must be found. But what is the air “threat” in the same area, someone will ask. Turkish F-16s will operate from the coast of Asia Minor, and they have a limited range of action. What will threaten us from the air south of Crete or in the Ionian Sea?
Opinion: Let’s Dare Greece’s FCx-30 Corvettes With ASTER 30 Missiles From FDI HN
Since our neighbors have been very organized in their movements, there is no guarantee that tomorrow they will not transfer a squadron of F-16s to Libya. They also have a TCG Anadolu at sea which will theoretically be equipped with Bayraktar TB3 UCAVs (with folding wings), while they claim that at some point it will also be able to launch jet-launched UCAVs (Kizilelma).. In short, there is a risk, and PN must be able to handle it.
We have touched on the issue of the “numbers” problem (or bends as Admiral Konidaris correctly put it first) many times. But since there are no ships available, PN will be forced to use smaller capabilities (eg missile) or even older and limited capabilities of S-class frigates. Such ships have very little capabilities to withstand saturation attacks from drones/Loitering munitions. They need additional protection, so today we will discuss an idea to make 100% use of the capabilities of our Kimon-class frigates, and even more so to increase them.
ThinkOutOfTheBox: Instead of 6 more Rafales, let’s buy another one from HN FDI
Right now a PN, even with 3 Kimons at any one time, will have 96 Aster 30’s in the field. Some “maps” released with Kimons
With enough distance between them to cover the Aegean Sea False: A warship does not make “fixed anti-aircraft artillery” in the middle of the ocean by itself. Also, the Kimon frigate cannot utilize 100% of the range of its missiles, if it does not have the assistance of ships, other fighters, or flying radars. That is, in multidisciplinary coordination that will identify targets, assess their severity and customize their interception, taking data from everywhere (SeaFire, F-35, Rafale, F-16V, EMB-145AEW, upgraded MEKO200HN, etc. OK). But the latter is also an advantage because the Aster 30 (especially this one, with its advanced fire-and-forget-if-need-it capabilities), can be useful and operational even without a powerful on-board radar firing it, since it will receive data from a command center. What do we want to say?
The FDI (and apparently also the HN FDI / “Kimon¨”) was “built” with the SETIS battle management system as its center. which has been optimized to use the Aster 30, with data from SeaFire radar. From there, it is SETIS that will tap into the data, carrying the data into the missile before launch, but also transmitting the data during flight. That is, the Asters of the “Kims” will receive target data after triggering the “fusion” (fusion) information, which will come to SETIS from several sources, among which is the organic SeaFire. Another Kimon can provide information to the Aster 30 on a frigate, or to the Rafale F3R’s MICA or Meteor missiles. This is where our proposal is based.
But let’s look at the state of our current anti-aircraft defense: to begin with, the S-300s in Crete are palliative. “Forced” missiles were tested several years ago, and since then we do not know how many missiles are still certified and capable of launching. The artillery is based in Crete, and they train PA and NATO pilots in the S-300, but to consider them combat-capable as eg. Patriots, it’s a big conversation. So they need to be replaced, regardless of whether we send them “package” to Ukraine or for recycling.
The logical option, of course, would be to purchase additional Patriot artillery, but its cost has reached a very high level. We say a “logical” choice because the system is already serving in Greece, and in large numbers. But since PN has purchased the Aster 30, is the SAMP/T, and this is the ground launch system for the missiles themselves, obviously “in” the game? That is, who will “freak out” the Air Force if it buys the SAMP / T system for Crete, when the same missile is in service with the Navy? But why does he do this?
Because such a purchase can be combined with the purchase of 2 or 3 SAMP / T artillery units from PN too! And in fact, the “sea” artillery units will be able to connect to the air defense network through FDI! Let’s explain a little how this can be done.
Let’s say the PN has a “kimon”, along with a caravan south of Rhodes / east of Crete. Meanwhile, it installed two SAMP/TV artillery on Kalymnos and one on Vai (Crete). “Kimon” acts as a floating headquarters, controlling the airspace from Cyprus to Crete, constantly receiving data from PA radars (air and ground), from PN ships, from MQ-9B unmanned aircraft and from allies (scenarios here are diverse). With 3 different launch points for the Aster 30, the entire area is under Greek control, with just one frigate (you might need some boost to the data processing controllers here, but that’s a low cost).
Of course, at the same time, any PN force will be covered by PA fighters, while there will also be organic ship defense missiles (RAM Block 2, ESSM Block 1 & 2, CAMM-ER or MICA, etc.). In such a “class” …
sequel to Maritime defence
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